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ABSTRACT
Visual imagery is integral to creative achievements in many fields, facilitating both the 
creative process and the public reception of the work. Certain images have been repeated 
or recreated by the individuals working in these domains. The process of repetition has 
been relatively unencumbered by spatial or temporal distances between appearances of 
the imagery, suggesting that people incorporating these images into their work prefer 
certain universal forms, or that these people have a propensity to choose certain forms. 
Preferences for typical and atypical image and symbol forms, considering personality 
preferences and orientations that might suggest reasons for individual differences in 
image preference and creativity, were studied to discern how they facilitate the reuse and 
modification of visual images. Participants high in creativity were expected to have 
higher image preferences than those low in creativity, especially for images with 
properties that are congruent with objective or subjective creativity measures.
Participants with higher introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving tendencies were 
expected to be more creative and have higher image preferences, as were participants 
with high levels of both skepticism and belief. Analyses demonstrated that participants 
preferred typical, gestalt-type images to those without gestalt form qualities, although 
previous exposure increased participants’ preferences for non-gestalt images. 
Relationships between image preference and creativity were weak, but personality type 
did relate to creativity as measured indirectly by figure preference, and interactions 
between skepticism and belief yielded higher indirect creativity scores and total image 
preferences.
PERSONALITY QUALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH VISUAL IMAGE 
PREFERENCE AND CREATIVITY
Introduction
Visual images and symbols are essential in the creation and transmission of ideas 
and experiences. The development of new symbol systems is integral to the progress of 
the domains in which these systems are generated. Visual images are readily created and 
used to present or represent a concept or convey an impression. Some images persist 
predominantly unchanged through many uses, whereas others undergo alterations in form 
or content during their repetitions.
Numerous images and symbols have been repeated in the creation of new images 
and symbols. Some recreations or forms are the same only in structure, whereas others 
are similar in structure and content to previously-created images. Some images may be 
more readily recreated than others. Perhaps these images are better perceived and 
recognized, making them more familiar to the perceiver. Creative endeavors involving 
imagery therefore would result from the reuse of recognizable images. If the selection of 
imagery and symbols is dependent on the person creating, then the repetition of forms 
suggests that creative people have a propensity to use similar images in their work. The 
probability of coincidental repetition is unlikely, and it is not a useful theory with which 
to explain all occurrences of recurrent imagery. It is more likely that personal variables 
predispose some people to prefer certain images or that certain images are more readily 
available and familiar to everyone. A combination of these possibilities is a more 
comprehensive explanation.
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3In this study, I examine the idea that people are predisposed to prefer images that 
possess certain qualities of form over images that lack these qualities and that people 
measuring high in creativity will have a stronger preference for all types of images. 
Creativity researchers have consistently maintained that a product or idea is deemed 
“creative” by virtue of both its novelty or originality and its utility or acceptability in a 
validated context (Amabile & Tighe, 1993; Feist, 1993; Gruber & Wallace, 1999; 
Koestler, 1964). These qualities might be reflected in creative individuals’ preferences 
for visual images, so that they will prefer images with form qualities to those without, but 
will show stronger preferences than their less-creative peers for images with altered form 
qualities. Possible evolutionary explanations and visual mechanisms describing why and 
how these events might occur provide a theoretical background for the expected 
outcomes. Personality preferences and orientations suggest reasons for individual 
differences in image preference and creativity. These facets of images and of people who 
create and use them are studied to discern how they facilitate the reuse and modification 
of visual images in a wide variety of times and locations.
Jung contributed some of the most comprehensive scholarship on the topic of 
symbol and image persistence across time and distance with his discovery and description 
of the collective unconscious as a prominent structure in the individual's mind and 
personality (Campbell, 1971; Jung, 1936). The collective unconscious is a repository of 
latent images or forms inherited from the recent and distant past. People do not 
consciously experience these images; rather, the images are pre-existent forms without 
content, provisions for a predisposed way of perceiving and acting toward certain 
experiences and things within the environment. These things, when encountered, bring
4the archetypal images into conscious awareness by their identification through the 
original, primordial model (Jung, 1936). The repetition of experiences throughout time 
and space has strengthened the establishment of specific images as potential forms for the 
experiences of future generations. Although the exact expression of these potentials is 
dependent upon the individual's experience, the prospect of expression is innate, and Jung 
believed, inherited by one generation from the learning of its progenators (Hall &
Nordby, 1973; Jung, 1936).
The evolution of the collective unconscious could be explained not only by the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, but also through the mechanism of natural 
selection of a biological nature, the evolution of the brain (Hall & Nordby, 1973). The 
archetypes of the collective unconscious could then be considered referents to selected 
patterns of perception and behavior, as well as structural images that the brain has 
evolved to recognize and recreate. The evolution of these pattem-recognition capacities 
will be clarified with a broad description of the mechanisms of visual processing.
Briefly, aspects of a visual scene are processed not in a sequential, serial fashion 
through a hierarchical system (although information about these features is necessarily 
conveyed serially as complexity and integration build) but in parallel, with information of 
different features transmitted through parallel pathways from the retina to the involved 
cortical regions (Zeki, 1998). The parallel nature of visual processing emphasizes the 
reassembly of a visual image from the input of separate feature-detecting brain areas that 
process components such as line orientation, motion, shape, and color (Zeki, 1998). 
Hypercolumns, the divisions of the primary visual cortex that respond to line orientation, 
are organized according to their receptivity to lines of varying orientations, such that an
5angle of a certain degree measure activates a different group (or groups) of neurons than 
an angle of another degree (Hubei & Wiesel, 1979). Forms with line orientations that 
closely "match" those to which the receptive cells maximally respond produce a greater 
response in the cells than line orientations that diverge from the optimal levels of 
response (Hubei & Wiesel, 1959). However, because of connections among groups of 
cells possessing the same response properties, a cell's response can be influenced by 
stimuli outside of its receptive field, and perception of an object therefore depends on the 
context in which it is presented (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1989). In addition, response to visual 
images can be heightened by amplifications of form qualities so that images with only the 
most essential features result in greater response and preference than similar images that 
are more familiar to the perceiver but less representative in form (Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee, 1998). Implications for the use of these perceptual principles as strategies for 
attentional capture suggest that images that closely adhere to the anatomical and 
physiological predispositions of the visual system are most likely to receive attention and 
to be replicated in modified forms.
The contemporary understanding of visual perception as a creative process has 
been guided by reference to gestalt perceptual principles of wholeness and integration 
(Kandel, 1991). The reassembly of an image is not an exact representation of the actual 
image viewed. Previously developed perceptual knowledge and processes affect the 
perceived result of visual processing; perception is guided by organizational principles 
that enable the viewer to recognize patterns rather than fragments of an image. 
Wertheimer (1945) called the most easily discernible of these patterns "gestalts," as a 
referent to the wholeness of organization resulting from the ease with which the pattern's
6parts are connected. Gestalt psychology is predicated on the idea that people recognize 
relations among individual parts of an image as having form quality (Miller, 1996). 
Certain principles of perceptual organization, such as proximity, similarity, continuation, 
closure, and symmetry, guide perception, making forms that possess these qualities more 
discemable than those that do not. These principles are utilized by the visual system 
such that incoming visual information is processed and reconstructed by their patterns 
(Miller, 1996). Gestalt-type figures, or figures with gestalt properties of line orientation, 
therefore tend to be organized in patterns to which the relevant cells in the hypercolumns 
are maximally receptive and responsive. Images possessing the characteristics of a 
gestalt might be more perceptible and therefore more readily reusable in creative 
endeavors. In addition to describing the characteristic structure of gestalt form, 
Wertheimer emphasized the structure to be found within a situation or context by a 
creator, and analogized this process to the emergence of perceptual properties 
(Wertheimer, 1945).
Recent thought on the evolution of the mind has focused attention toward the idea 
that perceptual patterns and capacities have evolved as either a product or a byproduct of 
the necessity of limiting the finite amount of focused awareness available to an infinite 
amount of information (Mithen, 1996; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). Without this 
function, the perceiver would be overwhelmed by a changing and undifferentiated 
amalgam of potentially unessential stimuli. Attention is given to those images that are 
most relevant and salient in the personal environment. "Extraneous" perceptions are 
discarded. When the process is routinized such that information from stimuli in the 
environment is interpreted within the framework of these perceptual patterns, the
7interpretations given to new information may be represented symbolically to connect or 
associate them with prior knowledge and meanings. The capacity to symbolize involves 
the ability to combine knowledge from previously unrelated, or apparently unrelated, 
domains to create a referent with regard to which the new information will be associated. 
Mi then (1996) argues that cognitive fluidity, an associative capacity that includes the 
ability to make connections and perform symbolic activities, is the property that 
distinguishes the modem mind from those of previous evolutionary stages.
Pattern recognition enables the association of old and new information, and a 
cognitively-fluid ability to create symbol and metaphor among perceptions and 
interpretations of stimuli enables the modem mind to make associations among domains 
of knowledge that previously would have been incongruent (Mithen, 1996). These 
connections strengthen the persistence of the involved patterns.
The evolution of pattern recognition and creation capacities involves common 
cognitive and perceptual mechanisms, but not all people are equally creative in their use 
of visual images. Individual differences in personality type may predispose some people 
to greater affinity for and creative use of visual images.
Jung's theory of personality type as interpreted by Myers and Briggs presents four 
dichotomous categories from which a dynamic personality preference is comprised 
(Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). The four dichotomous categories are 
opposite domains of mental functioning, and include opposite ways of perceiving 
(sensation and intuition), opposite ways of judging (thinking and feeling), opposite 
attitudes in which preferred judgement and preferred perception are typically used
(judgement and perception), and opposite ways of relating to the world (extraversion and 
introversion).
Because their patterns of orientation are more novel, images with altered gestalt 
characteristics, operationally termed non-gestalt images, invite a more subjective 
evaluation than do those images with intact gestalt properties. Different personality type 
preferences could be expected to demonstrate different levels of preference for gestalt 
and non-gestalt images. Jung described his type preferences as having objective and 
subjective poles (Jung, 1971). The objective poles are extraversion, sensing, and 
thinking, and the subjective are introversion, intuition, and feeling. A succinct 
description of each will suggest why people differing in their preferences for these poles 
might differ also in their image preferences.
Someone with a preference for extraversion orients himself or herself to people, 
objects, and experiences in the external environment, whereas a person preferring an 
introverted attitude values the internal, subjective state, focusing on ideas and concepts.
People with a preference for sensing as their predominant function of knowledge 
acquisition apprehend the immediate qualities of experience as observed by the senses. 
They are therefore usually attuned to the readily-observable and concrete reality of the 
present moment. Those preferring intuition are apt to prefer potential patterns and 
meanings in events, and are therefore more attuned to future possibilities, including 
theoretical and abstract relationships, than present actualities. Objectivity and 
impartiality in decision making and a logical evaluation of knowledge and ideas 
characterize a thinking disposition. Feeling preferences reflect tendencies toward
9decision making in accord with relative, subjective values that are personally important to 
the decision maker and to those whom the decision will affect (Myers et al, 1998).
Briggs and Myers furthered Jung's work in the area of preferred orientations to the 
outer world by developing the fourth dichotomy, judging-perceiving. People preferring 
the perceiving function spend more time observing and gathering information before 
reaching a decision, whereas those among whom judgement is preferred are quicker to 
make decisions based on available information (Myers et al, 1998).
A person's preference for different means of apprehending and comprehending 
information and for orienting himself or herself to the world might affect perception, 
preference, and creative use of images, particularly those images displaying gestalt 
principles of perceptual organization. People with intuitive preferences have shown more 
interest in fantasy and imagery than have sensing types (Ireland & Keman-Schloss, 1983; 
O'Haire & Marcia, 1980; Palmiere, 1972), attributable in part to the greater tendency of 
intuitive types to attempt to suspend time (Myers, et al, 1998). Intuition has been defined 
as an initially-unaware perception of coherence in pattern, meaning, or form (Bowers, 
Regher, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). Considering the preferences of creative people for 
novelty as a means of mental stimulation (Houston & Mednick, 1963), intuition, as the 
function most involved with perception and response to previously unconnected or 
unrealized patterns, it is the preference most associated with creative potential (Myers, et 
al).
Hall and McKinnon (1969) evaluated the proportion and degree of preference of 
intuition among three groups of architects, and found that both the proportion of intuitive 
types and the degrees of preference for intuition were highest among the architects
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deemed highly creative, and were higher among those working with the highly creative 
architects than for a matched sample of control architects. Evidence for higher 
preferences for intuition among creative people is augmented by the consideration that 
the general population predominantly prefers sensing, at an approximate estimate of 75% 
to 25% (Myers, et al, 1998).
The curiosity and receptiveness to new information and situations attendant with 
the perceiving function enhance creativity in circumstances requiring an innovative 
response, but relationships between creativity and the extraversion/introversion and 
thinking/feeling scales are less definitive, and probably exhibit greater fluctuation among 
domains (Myers, et al, 1998).
People preferring the subjective poles of introversion, intuition, feeling and 
perceiving might prefer the congruently-subjective qualities of non-gestalt images, which 
require the viewer to appropriate more attention to novel configurations that require more 
perceptual effort than the readily-perceived gestalt images. People open to new 
experiences have demonstrated higher preferences for abstract art than people low in 
openness (Brady, 2000), and openness to experience has correlated strongly with 
intuition and marginally with perception (McCrae & Costa, 1989), supporting the 
contention that the attributes of curiosity and receptiveness associated with perceiving 
and innovation associated with intuition are related to a preference for theoretical and 
abstract relationships.
Skepticism and belief also involve orientations toward knowledge and preferred 
ways of responding to external information. Individual differences in preference for a 
source of knowledge, means of apprehending and comprehending information, and
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behaving in response to information gathered should be related to the characteristic 
orientation that a person displays in his or her preferences and creative abilities. As 
orientations toward knowledge, skepticism is characterized by science-mindedness, or an 
affinity for the empirical processes and contents of science, and belief refers to openness 
to or endorsement of unusual or extraordinary paranormal or religious ideas.
Jung (1971) suggests that external objects of empirical observation dominate 
traditional conceptions of science. Information is gathered, processed, and used in the 
simplest and most parsimonious arrangement possible. Preference for the immediacy of 
external objects and experience unencumbered by concepts is considered a hallmark of 
empiricism, and thus the object-oriented thinker is characterized by skepticism toward the 
subjective, non-empirical qualities of idea and theory.
Jung places religious life and practice in the subjective, rational realm, stating that 
religion has become dominated by the subjective idea since science has replaced religion 
as the external, objective fact (Jung, 1971). Science-mindedness is reliant on external 
linear processes of cause and effect, but belief and religion, as rationally important, 
subjective ideas, are free from the determinism that is attendant with the more objective 
orientations. Jung suggests that an idea can be assimilative, whereas facts require 
categorization. Association and elaboration are favored over congruent and efficient 
expression.
These orientations toward knowledge and information have implications for 
image perception and creative behavior. Reliance on observable data might predispose 
people to prefer images that are more pattern-congruent, converge on simplicity, and
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provide the most parsimonious arrangement of available information. Such images may 
be "workable" tools for scientific thought, rather than forms of subjective expression.
Preference for subjective ideas, represented internally, might relate to a preference 
for assimilation of imagery, such that patterns are rearranged or reformed in novel 
combinations that increase their visual complexity by diverging from common form 
qualities. Subjective preferences associated with religion and belief would be free from, 
or would extend beyond, preferences constrained by convergence on pattern congruency 
and simplicity.
Although empiricism and subjectivity continue to be associated with traditional 
attitudes toward science/skepticism and religion/belief, respectively, changing thought 
and paradigm shifts in the sciences have produced different attitudes toward the 
enterprise and practice of science. For example, the shift from the idea of conceiving the 
mind as an initially-blank receptacle for sensory experience to one espousing more active 
cognitive mechanisms for the reception and organization of experience emphasizes 
abstractions from perception and thought that are characteristic internal and subjective 
representations of ideas. The subject matter and the processes of science both have 
become more reliant on speculative interpretations of theory and data. Scientific work is 
therefore more dependent on the internal representations of its practitioners during such 
paradigm shifts.
Shifting trends in science are complemented by periods of increased efforts to 
"scientize" religion, or bring an objective, scientific orientation to traditionally-subjective 
religious ideas. Given these juxtapositions of content and approach to science and
13
religion, a standard personality profile of a classic "skeptic" or "believer" will be 
untenable.
Interactions among degrees and types of skepticism and belief might produce an 
orientation toward information and an evaluation of content that is not characteristic 
solely of a typical reliance on observable data or belief-focused value of subjective ideas 
and representations. For some people, then, the domains of religion and science are 
inherently mutually contradicting. For some, religion and science ask and suggest 
answers to different types of questions, and for others, the methods of approach to 
science and religion and the content of each are more flexible, and therefore more 
amenable to mutual interaction.
Skepticism and belief can be measured along two unipolar dimensions, resulting 
in combinations of high and low skepticism and belief for each person. People 
possessing high levels of both skepticism and belief have demonstrated greater 
integrative complexity in their responses to three domain-specific questions (Stemme & 
Feist, 1999), indicating that they were better able to differentiate and integrate different 
dimensions of thought when considering a problem. The ability to recombine ideas into a 
unique synthesis of thought may parallel creative abilities in visual imagery tasks, and 
different levels of skepticism and belief may influence or interact with image preference. 
People for whom the constructs of skepticism and belief interact might also demonstrate 
greater fluidity of thought when requested to "converge" on a correct response to a given 
problem and "diverge" into novel constructions or recombinations of visual images.
Physiological and anatomical findings lend credence to the involvement of 
skepticism and belief orientations in image preference and creativity. Visual imagery is
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associated with right hemispheric cortical activation (Martindale, 1999; Penfield & 
Roberts, 1958), as are quasi-hallucinatory experiences (Jaynes, 1976). An increase in 
differential activation of the right hemisphere is associated with religious experience and 
belief (Persinger, 1993). This suggests a common mechanism or common activation for 
perception of visual images and anomalous experiences that might lend themselves to 
extraordinary belief.
Greater right-hemispheric activation during tasks requiring a creative response is 
associated with higher levels of creativity (Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, & Covello,
1984). Relatively high degrees of extraordinary belief may be related to aspects of 
creativity that require divergence from normative patterns, perceptions, and organizations 
of information. Logical, analytical thought processes are associated with left-hemisphere 
activation (Kupfermann, 1991). Skeptics have been shown to have higher critical 
thinking ability than believers (Alcock & Otis, 1980), possibly due to a scientific bias.
Katz (1986) found that the most creative individuals in a domain or profession 
show dominance in the hemisphere that is contralateral to that most notably used in their 
work, and suggests that their creativity results from the addition of abilities from the 
contralateral hemisphere. Some people regarded for their scientific genius have been 
noted as having a high degree of skepticism toward traditional ideas coupled with open- 
mindedness toward novel ideas (Koestler, 1964). Perhaps the disposition toward 
skepticism provides the basis for the evaluative thought necessary to converge on an 
appropriate solution to a problem, and when combined with a high degree of belief, 
results in a combination that facilitates both convergent and divergent thought. Creative 
people have demonstrated greater asymmetry of cortical activation, dependent on the task
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or stage of creative process, than have less creative control subjects (Martindale et al, 
1984). Asymmetry of activation may be related to the formation of combined skeptic and 
belief orientations.
People who possess a high degree of both skepticism and belief may be better 
able to develop the associative thinking processes necessary to combine originality and 
context-dependent usefulness in the generation of creative products. They would also be 
expected to show high preferences for both gestalt images (convergent, pattern-congruent 
forms) and non-gestalt images (divergent alterations of form), in keeping with the 
emphasis on familiarity and novelty.
Because creative achievements maintain an association with previous work and 
must be acknowledged by the field in which the work is evaluated (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1988), the qualities and preferences of people deemed creative are not entirely discrepant 
from those of their less-creative peers. The images preferences expressed by participants 
may differ in degree, but not direction, between more- and less-creative people.
Therefore, all people are expected to prefer gestalt images to non-gestalt images.
Mednick (1962) proposed that the creative thinking process involves combining 
remote elements in a way that is useful or fitting to specific criteria. A person’s ability to 
associate remote aspects of a problem depends on the presence and conceptual 
arrangement of the elements in his or her knowledge base, such that someone with a 
broad knowledge base with many interconnections among concepts would be better able 
to generate creative solutions than someone with either a more impoverished knowledge 
base or one with fewer interconnections. The Remote Associates Test (Mednick, 1962) 
measures the capacity for associating three apparently unrelated or remotely-related
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words with the provision of a fourth word that relates to each of the three. Participants 
who are more creative at associating remote elements to converge on the correct answer 
are expected to have a higher preference than less-creative participants for gestalt images.
Participants who are creative in their abilities to construct the most novel and 
divergent, yet recognizable, patterns with common shapes are expected to prefer images 
with skewed or altered gestalt characteristics, non-gestalt images, to a greater degree than 
their less creative peers. It is possible that these creative people will more readily 
perceive gestalt images, which themselves are more readily perceived, and will be more 
likely to prefer modifications to these images to increase the novelty of their patterns.
The novelty of an image may be reflected in its complexity, and creative people are 
expected to prefer complex images requiring increased attention over simple, more- 
familiar patterns to a degree greater than that of their less-creative peers.
Creative people have generally preferred complex images to simple figures on 
the Barron-Welsch Art Scale (Welsch & Barron, 1963), a relationship that reflects the 
association between creativity and tolerance for ambiguity (Barron, 1963), and lends 
credence to the expectation that people who demonstrate the ability to create novel 
patterns from common elements will have higher preferences for non-gestalt images. 
Novel pattern creations are expected also to relate to figure preference scores on the 
Barron-Welsch Art Scale. Participants' preferences for complex, asymmetrical images on 
the Art Scale are expected to relate positively to their preferences for non-gestalt images 
and negatively to preferences for gestalt images.
Different personality type preferences are expected to relate to different degrees 
of preference for gestalt and non-gestalt images. Personality-type preferences for the
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subjective poles of the four Myers-Briggs dichotomous scales are expected to relate to 
stronger preferences for non-gestalt images.
Images preferences are expected to differ among participants with different 
combinations of skepticism and belief. People categorized as high in skepticism are 
expected to have higher preferences for gestalt images than those low in skepticism. 
People categorized as high in belief are expected to have stronger preferences for non­
gestalt images than are people low in belief. People categorized as high in both 
skepticism and belief are expected to have the highest overall image preferences.
Creativity is expected to relate to personality type preferences, with the subjective 
poles of introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving relating to higher scores on the 
Barron-Welsch Art Scale, indicating stronger preferences for complex images.
Creativity is expected to differ among participants with different levels of 
skepticism and belief. Participants measuring high in skepticism are expected to have 
higher scores than those low in skepticism on the RAT. Art Scale scores are expected to 
differ among participants high and low in skepticism and belief.
The preceding hypotheses, enumerated, are:
1. All participants are expected to prefer gestalt images to non-gestalt images.
2. Drawing task scores are expected to relate positively to figure preference 
scores on the Barron-Welsch Art Scale.
3. Participants with higher RAT scores are expected to have a higher preference 
than less-creative participants for gestalt images.
4. Participants who score higher on the drawing task are expected to prefer 
images with skewed or altered gestalt characteristics, non-gestalt images, to a 
greater degree than their less creative peers.
5. Participants' preferences for complex, asymmetrical images on the Art Scale 
are expected to relate positively to their preferences for non-gestalt images 
and negatively to preferences for gestalt images.
6. Different personality type preferences are expected to relate to different 
degrees of preference for gestalt and non-gestalt images. Personality-type 
preferences for the subjective poles of the four Myers-Briggs dichotomous 
scales are expected to relate to stronger preferences for non-gestalt images.
7. Images preferences are expected to differ among participants with different 
combinations of skepticism and belief. People categorized as high in 
skepticism are expected to have higher preferences for gestalt images than 
those low in skepticism. People categorized as high in belief are expected to 
have stronger preferences for non-gestalt images than are people low in belief. 
People categorized as high in both skepticism and belief are expected to have 
the highest overall image preferences.
8. Creativity is expected to relate to personality type preferences, with the 
subjective poles of introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving relating to 
higher scores on the Barron-Welsch Art Scale, indicating stronger preferences 
for complex images.
9. Creativity is expected to differ among participants with different levels of 
skepticism and belief. Participants measuring high in skepticism are expected
19
to have higher scores than those low in skepticism on the RAT. Art Scale 
scores are expected to differ among participants high and low in skepticism 
and belief.
Method
Participants
Seventy-four students, 34 male and 40 female, enrolled in introductory 
psychology classes during the spring of 2000 participated in this study. Each student 
received one hour of course credit for his or her participation.
Instruments
Images: Sixty visual images and symbols in a simple, clip-art form were used in 
this study (Appendix A). The images were comprised of relatively common figures, 
objects, and shapes. Twenty of these images were created having high "form quality," a 
term operationalized to indicate perceptual properties including symmetry, proximity, 
similarity, continuation, and closure. These images were called "gestalt" images, and 
each displayed on or more qualities of form.
The other forty images were objects and shapes similar to the gestalt images, but 
had altered or skewed form qualities. Examples include a face with blatantly 
asymmetrical features, a circle that doesn't close, and groups of geometric shapes 
scattered in such a way as to prevent similar shapes and sizes of shapes from appearing 
proximal to each other in the display space. This group of images was termed “non­
gestalt” in reference to the images’ deviations from gestalt form.
Creativity: The Remote Associates Test (RAT): The RAT (Appendix B) is an 
assessment of creativity on which participants must associate words into new
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combinations by providing a fourth word that is associated with each of three given 
words. Items include "mower, atomic, foreign," and "out, dog, cat," to which correct 
responses would be, respectively, "power" and "house" (Mednick, 1962). A 10-item 
version of the RAT was administered to participants to assess their abilities to combine 
remote elements into new associations that converge on a correct answer to each item.
Creativity: Drawing Task: Four groupings of two-dimensional geometric shapes 
and alphabet letters (Appendix C) developed for an experiment on creative mental 
synthesis (Finke & Slayton, 1988) were given in groups of three to participants, who 
were asked to create novel constructions or patterns with all three objects in each group. 
Participants were told they could alter the size and orientation of the presented shapes, 
but they could not alter the form or structure of any shape. In addition, participants were 
asked to name or label each drawing. They had one minute to complete each drawing. 
Each of the four drawings was rated on recognizability and novelty. Scores were given 
as percentages based on the total numbers of a specific response. A total score for each 
participant was obtained by summing the scores of the four drawings. Drawings that 
were unrecognizable or unlabeled, or that did not adhere to the instructions for form and 
content, were given a score of zero. This scoring system reflects the general aims of the 
Finke and Slayton (1988) study from which these shapes were drawn, but was modified 
to better-suit the purposes and smaller sample sizes of this study. This drawing task was 
given to participants to assess their ability to creatively synthesize images or parts of 
images into original forms.
Image Complexity: The Barron-Welsch Art Scale: The Barron-Welsch Art Scale 
(Appendix D) is an 86-item inventory of drawings that are classified as either complex
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and asymmetrical or simple and symmetrical (Welsch & Barron, 1963). Forty of the 
items were used in this study. Participants indicate their preferences by responding that 
they "like" or "dislike" each image. Participants are given one point for each complex 
image that they like and simple image that they dislike. Scale scores are the sum of the 
participants' total points.
Skepticism: The Scientific Attitude Inventory II (SAI-ID: The scientific attitude is 
not directly analogous to skepticism, but overlaps conceptually with skepticism as an 
empirically-minded, objective evaluation of information. For this reason, and because of 
the lack of instruments directly measuring skepticism independently of paranormal and/or 
religious belief, the SAIII was used to assess participants’ levels of skepticism. The 
SAI-H (Appendix E) is a revision of the Scientific Attitude Inventory and uses a five-item 
Likert response scale on 40 items to measure attitude and position toward science and the 
scientific enterprise. Items include statements such as "Scientists are always interested in 
better explanations of things," "The senses are one of the most important tools a scientist 
has," and "I would like to work with other scientists to solve scientific problems." 
Responses to each item can range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
Information concerning reliability and validity is provided in the published scale (Moore 
& Foy, 1997).
Belief: The Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS): The Paranormal Belief Scale 
(Appendix F) is a 25-item self-report questionnaire that uses a five-item Likert response 
scale to assess paranormal belief on seven dimensions represented as paranormal 
subscales. Items include statements such as "The soul continues to exist though the body 
may die," "Dreams can provide information about the future," and "The Loch Ness
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monster of Scotland exists." Responses to each item can range from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (5). Reliability and validity information is provided in the published 
scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
Personality Type: The Mvers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI): The MBTI 
(Appendix G) is a 93-item inventory measuring personality-type preferences along four 
dichotomous categories (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). These 
preferences comprise a dynamic personality type that is greater than the sum of its 
combined parts. The four dichotomous categories are opposite domains of mental 
functioning, and include opposite ways of perceiving (sensation and intuition), opposite 
ways of judging (thinking and feeling), opposite attitudes in which preferred judgement 
and preferred perception are typically used (extraversion and introversion), and opposite 
ways of relating to the world (judging and perceiving). Each of the scale's 93 questions 
has a dichotomous response option from one preference category. Each response is 
counted toward one pole of a category. Responses were summed for each question, 
yielding scores for each pole of each category scale, a total of eight scale scores per 
participant.
Program
Images were presented on a computer projection system using Inquisit, an 
experimental laboratory software program developed to design and run experiments and 
to collect data.
Procedure
Participants were given instructions (Appendix H) and the consent form 
(Appendix I). Series of images were presented to participants at two successive times, T1
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and T2. There were three different orderings of image presentation, categorized as image 
groups 1-3. Group 1 images were presented subliminally at T1 and supraliminally at T2. 
Group 2 images were presented supraliminally at T1 and supraliminally at T2. Group 3 
images were not presented at T1 and were presented supraliminally at T2. Images 
presented subliminally were preceded and followed by a TIME/FRAME gray blanking 
screen used as a mask to decrease exposure time and prevent afterimage effects. Degrees 
of image presentation differed at T1 to enable comparison of participants' preferences for 
image types to which they had been exposed previously. For one-half of the participants, 
approximately half of the images in each group were high in form quality and half were 
low in form quality. For the other half, all images were low in form quality. Images 
were randomly grouped and ordered in presentation. As they viewed each image 
presented at T2, participants were asked whether or not they liked the image (preference 
ratings on a 1-7 scale).
After the second series of image presentations, participants completed the Remote 
Associates Test and constructed four patterns using three shapes per pattern from each of 
four sets, used previously in studies conducted by Finke and Slayton (1988). Participants 
then completed the Barron-Welsch Art Scale, the Scientific Attitude Inventory n, the 
Paranormal Belief Scale, and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Following completion of 
the experiment, a debriefing statement (Appendix J) explaining the purpose and rationale 
of the study was made available to participants.
Image Preference Ratings
Participants rated either a combination of gestalt and non-gestalt images or non­
gestalt images only. Twenty-two participants had usable data for gestalt image ratings
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and 44 participants had usable data for non-gestalt image ratings. For those analyses 
comparing gestalt images to non-gestalt images, participants' scores were included only if 
they rated both gestalt and non-gestalt images.
Of the 74 participants in the study, 58 had complete and usable data on the 
Remote Associates Test. The test is scored by giving one point for each correct response, 
yielding a range of possible scores from 0-10. Participant scores ranged from 0-9.
Sixty-two participants had complete data on the modified Finke and Slayton 
(1988) drawing task. Scores were determined as percentages based on the total numbers 
of a specific response. For example, if the same drawing were constructed by 16 people, 
each participant that constructed it was given a score of 1/16 for that drawing. If a 
drawing was unrecognizable or unlabeled, or deviated from the directions given for form 
and content, it was given a score of zero. Total scores were summed across four 
drawings, and ranged from .13-3.5.
Art Scale Scores
Fifty-nine participants had complete data for the Barron-Welsch Art Scale. The 
range of possible scores is 0-29. The participant score range was 1-23.
Personality-Type Preferences
Forty-seven participants had complete data on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. 
The four dichotomous scales of the Type Indicator have individual ranges of preference 
scores, each with a minimum of zero. The dichotomous choices on each scale sum to that 
scale's maximum score. The maximum score between extraversion and introversion is 
21, between sensing and intuition is 26, between thinking and feeling is 24, and between 
judgement and perceiving is 22. For example, someone with an extraversion score of 8
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would have a corresponding introversion score of 13, and someone with a sensing score 
of 0 would have an intuition score of 26. Participant scores spanned the entire range of 
each scale. Analyses of participants' scores on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator were 
performed with each of the eight resulting scale scores.
Categorical Groupings by Scores on the Scientific Attitude Inventory and the Paranormal 
Belief Scale
Scale scores on the Scientific Attitude Inventory (SAI) and Paranormal Belief 
Scale (PBS) were dichotomized into high and low categories and then used to create a 
2x2 grouping variable to place participants in categories reflecting different levels and 
combinations of skepticism and belief.
Fifty-eight participants had complete data on the Scientific Attitude Inventory II. 
The range of possible scores is 40-200, and participants' scores ranged from 115-179. A 
median split at 141 was used to place participants into groups of low-and high 
skepticism. Thirty participants were placed in the low-skepticism category, and 28 
participants were placed in the high-skepticism category.
Fifty-eight participants had complete data on the Paranormal Belief Scale. The 
range of possible scores is 25-125, and participants' scores ranged from 30-92. A median 
split at 68 placed 30 participants into the low-belief grouping and 28 participants into the 
high-belief grouping.
A 2x2 grouping variable was computed between the skepticism groupings and the 
belief groupings. Participants were categorized as low in skepticism and low in belief 
(n=14), high in skepticism and low in belief (n=16), low in skepticism and high in belief
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(n=16), and high in skepticism and high in belief (n=12). The resulting groups were 
given the names "neither," "skeptic," "believer," or "both," for clarity of reference.
Results
Preferences for Gestalt Images and Non-gestalt Images
Ratings for gestalt images were expected to be higher than for non-gestalt images. 
Preference ratings were computed for all images shown to participants in the combined 
gestalt and non-gestalt group. Each of the participants rated his or her preferences for 15 
gestalt images and 15 non-gestalt images. The preference means were 4.24 for gestalt 
images and 3.29 for non-gestalt images. A paired-samples comparison determined that 
ratings of images differed by image type (t (21) = 5.905, p < .001), with higher ratings for 
gestalt images, as predicted. Preferences for gestalt and non-gestalt images were related 
(r (22) = .628, p < .005).
Preliminary paired-sample comparisons of gestalt and non-gestalt images at 
different levels of previous exposure confirmed the effects of previous supraliminal 
exposure on image ratings for non-gestalt images. Preference ratings for gestalt- 
subliminal and gestalt-new images were significantly higher than those for non-gestalt- 
subliminal and non-gestalt-new images (t (21) = 4.353, p < .001; t (21) = 5.955, p <
.001), but preferences for gestalt-supraliminal images did not differ significantly from 
those for non-gestalt-supraliminal images (t (21) = 1.471, p > .05). Preferences for 
gestalt images did not differ between gestalt-subliminal and gestalt-supraliminal, gestalt- 
subliminal and gestalt-new, or non-gestalt-subliminal and non-gestalt new (t (21) = .254, 
P > .05; t (21) = -.213, p > .05; t (21) = .122, p > .05), but were different between non­
gestalt-subliminal and non-gestalt-supraliminal (t (21) = 2.518, p < .05). Descriptive
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statistics for gestalt and non-gestalt images at the three levels of previous exposure are 
presented in Table 1.
Creativity Measures
Drawing task scores were expected to relate positively to Art Scale scores, but the 
relationship was not significant (r (43) = -.194, p > .05), and means were opposite the 
predicted direction. Correlations between both the RAT and the drawing task and the 
RAT and the Art Scale were not significant (r (55) = -.208, p > .05; r (39) = -.116, p > 
.05). Therefore, image preferences and personality measures were analyzed with regard 
to independent creativity measures rather than a combined creativity variable.
Image Preference and Creativity
Image preference was expected to co-vary with participants’ types and levels of 
creativity. Preference for gestalt images was expected to relate positively to scores on the 
RAT. The relationship was marginally significant (r (13) = .462, p = .056).
Preference for non-gestalt images was expected to relate positively to scores on 
the drawing task. Preferences for non-gestalt images did not relate to drawing task scores 
(r (32) = .047, p > .05).
Art Scale scores were expected to relate positively to preferences for non-gestalt 
images and negatively to preferences for gestalt images. The inverse correlation between 
Art Scale scores and gestalt images was significant (r (9) = -.741, p < .05), but the 
correlation between Art Scale score and preference for non-gestalt images was not (r (21) 
= .160, p >  .05).
Image Preference and Personality Type
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Personality-type components were expected to relate to degrees of preference for 
gestalt and non-gestalt images. Preferences for the subjective (I, N, F, P) poles of the 
four Myers-Briggs dichotomous scales were expected to correlate positively with 
preferences for non-gestalt images. Preference for extraversion was marginally related to 
preference for gestalt images (r (6) = .796, p = .058). No other significant relationships 
were found among personality types and image preferences.
Image Preference and Skepticism and Belief
Participants with different levels of skepticism and belief were expected to differ 
in their preferences for gestalt and non-gestalt images. People categorized as high in 
skepticism were expected to have higher preferences for gestalt images than those low in 
skepticism, and they did (F (I, 6) = 11.132, p < .05). Participants high in belief were 
expected to have higher preferences for non-gestalt images than were those low in belief, 
but the difference was not significant (F (1, 18) = .775, p > .05). Descriptive statistics on 
gestalt and non-gestalt image preferences and levels of skepticism and belief are 
presented in Table 2.
People categorized as high in both skepticism and belief were expected to have 
the highest overall image preferences. Differences in total image preferences among 
skepticism/belief groupings were marginally significant (F (3, 4) = 6.292, p = .054), and 
linear contrasts determined that the overall mean preference ratings of the "both” group 
were significantly higher than those of the "neither,” "skeptic," and "believer” groups 
combined (t (4) = 3.566, p < .05). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for image 
preferences by categorization on the combined skepticism and belief grouping variable. 
Creativity and Personality
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Preferences for the subjective I, N, F, and P poles of the MBTI were expected to 
correlate positively with Art Scale scores. Preferences for introversion, intuition, feeling, 
and perceiving are positively related to Art-Scale scores, and preferences for the opposite, 
objective poles are negatively related to scores on the Art Scale. The relationship 
between intuition and Art Scale scores was the weakest correlation (r (47) = .2, p = .088), 
and the opposite sensing preference had a stronger relationship to the Art Scale (r (47) = - 
.405, p = < .005). All correlations are therefore of least marginal significance, and are 
presented in Table 4.
Creativity and Skepticism and Belief
Participants measuring high in skepticism were expected to have higher scores on 
the RAT than those low in skepticism. Mean differences between the two groups were 
not significant (F (1, 37) = .499, p > .05).
Scores on the Art Scale were expected to differ among participants with different 
levels of skepticism and belief. The interaction between skepticism and belief was 
significant for Art Scale scores (F (1, 54) = 4.64, p < .05), suggesting that interacting 
levels of these orientations, rather than isolated levels of one or the other, are associated 
with higher scores on the Art Scale. The interaction is displayed in Figure 1.
Discussion
The primary purposes of this study were to provide a rationale for possible 
methods and reasons for the persistence of certain kinds of image and symbol forms, to 
consider the modifications and alterations made to images in their various appearances, 
and to examine the individual qualities that might predispose some people to prefer 
certain images and use them creatively in their work. Attributes of the images and of the
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participants to whom they were presented were expected to clarify potential factors that 
might facilitate preference for and creative transmission of image forms. Study of the 
confluence of image properties, creative abilities and processes, and personality attributes 
can be strengthened by consideration of the relationships discovered and practical 
concerns encountered in this study. Future work in this area might present the overall 
profile of creative individuals that did not emerge from separate findings on image 
preference, personality, and skepticism and belief orientations in this study.
Image Preference Findings
Participants preferred gestalt images to non-gestalt images, supporting the 
contention that people are inclined to prefer form-congruent, meaningful patterns to 
images with disordered or reordered elements. Preferences for the two types of images 
correlated positively, supporting the evaluation of gestalt and non-gestalt images 
independently of one another and as combined total image preference scores with regard 
to creativity, personality, and skepticism and belief orientations.
Preliminary exploration of the effects of image exposure on preferences for 
gestalt and non-gestalt images indicates that previous exposure to visual images increases 
preference for atypical, incongruent forms more than for expected, orderly forms. 
Preferences for gestalt and non-gestalt images were equivalent for images to which 
participants previously had been exposed supraliminally, and preferences for non-gestalt 
images were higher for previously supraliminal images than for previously subliminal 
images, but did not differ between previously subliminal images and new images. 
Awareness of previous image presentation therefore seems to be a predisposing variable
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in increasing preferences for non-gestalt images. Preferences for gestalt images did not 
differ with respect to type of prior image presentation.
Convergent creativity, as measured by the RAT, was marginally related to 
preferences for gestalt images, providing some evidence that people who are adept at 
tasks requiring both originality of associations and intelligence to converge on a useful 
outcome prefer images that express order and simplicity to a degree greater than that of 
their less-creative peers. Although Art Scale scores were negatively related to gestalt 
image preference, no associations were found among preferences for non-gestalt images, 
scores on the drawing task, and scores on the Art Scale. The latter finding detracts from 
the speculation that an underlying subjective preference and use of visual images can be 
demonstrated through these measures.
The contribution of subjective personality orientations is mildly supported by 
relationships of personality types to image preferences. Jung (1971) described his 
proposed personality types as dynamic combinations of dichotomous preferences along 
three continuous scales, each having an objective and subjective pole. Jung suggested 
that introversion, intuition, and feeling reflect the subjective orientation. Myers’ and 
Briggs’ development of the judging-perceiving dichotomy adds perceiving as the fourth 
subjective personality preference (Myers, et al, 1998). Preferences for introversion, 
intuition, feeling, and perceiving were not found to be related to preferences for non­
gestalt images, as predicted based on the aspects of subjectivity suggested for these 
variables. Preference for extraversion was related to preference for gestalt images, but 
this finding lends only weak support to the hypothesized congruence of subjectivity.
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The image preferences of participants with varying skepticism and belief levels 
are more congruent with a global conception of objective and subjective orientations. 
Skepticism as measured by the S A III incorporates an attitude of enthusiasm for the 
empirical processes of science, and therefore is presumed to share with science- 
mindedness a preference for an orderly and congruent arrangement of data and concepts. 
The finding that participants grouped as high in skepticism gave higher preference ratings 
than those grouped low in skepticism to gestalt images reflects this predilection.
No differences were found between participants high and low in belief on preferences for 
non-gestalt images, weakening the speculation that a high belief orientation might 
predispose a person to prefer unusual and altered patterns. However, participants scoring 
high on measures of both skepticism and belief had higher total image preferences, 
combined from gestalt and non-gestalt preference means, than the skeptics, believers, and 
“neithers” combined, supporting the role of belief as a contributor to preferences for 
novel images and altered form patterns, and to the combination of objective and 
subjective expressions in visual image appreciation.
Creativity Findings
The RAT, drawing task, and Art Scale scores did not correlate with one another, 
making necessary the use of independent creativity measures for comparisons among 
personality type preferences and skepticism and belief orientations. MBTI preferences 
for introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving were related to higher levels of 
creativity as measured by preferences for the complex image forms on the Bairon-Welsch 
Art Scale, and the opposite, objective orientations (extraversion, sensing, thinking, and 
judging) were negatively related to complex Art Scale image preference. Relationships
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between personality type preferences and Art Scale scores support the idea that subjective 
personality orientations are related to preferences for novelty and complexity, and that 
objective orientations may be similarly related to preferences for more concrete, 
symmetrical forms.
Participants measuring high and low in skepticism did not differ in RAT scores, 
despite expectations that objectivity and critical thinking ability would be demonstrably 
involved in both measures. The interaction of skepticism and belief corresponded to Art 
Scale scores, implicating the confluence of both orientations as an important factor in 
complex and novel image preference and potentially creative image use.
Practical Concerns and Limitations
Data collection: Availability and completeness of data were not uniform for all 
participants. Too large a number of participants had incomplete overall data to dismiss 
errors in data collection. A more complete data set would have increased predictive 
power, possibly increasing the number of significant findings, particularly in those 
analyses in which reported effect sizes were compromised by groups with very small 
sample sizes.
Equipment difficulties: Equipment error caused problems with experimental 
control that resulted in incomplete data for some participants. The rate of image 
presentation was not constant for some groups of participants, and their image preference 
ratings were discarded. Preference-rating data was not differentially discarded among 
participants with complete or incomplete data on other measures; the resulting decrease 
in predictive power is therefore of greater concern than is undue influence of image 
presentation among participants.
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Experimental milieu: Considerations of time may have impacted the collection of 
valid data on creative performance and the preferences associated with creativity, 
especially on those measures, such as the RAT and the drawing task, that are timed. The 
experiment was conducted and measures taken within a narrow time span; “real-world” 
creativity is more fluid and possibly atemporal. People with different personality type 
preferences have demonstrated different responses to time and its passage (Mann,
Siegler, & Osmond, 1968; Myers, et al, 1998). Indeed, the preferences often most- 
associated with innovation—intuition and perceiving (Gryskiewicz & Tullar, 1995; 
Myers, et al, 1998)—have been theorized and shown to be less aware of time 
requirements and constraints (Myers, et al). The experimental setting might be most 
restrictive for the expression of creativity among people with these preferences.
Creativity determined by discrete intervals may not accurately or adequately represent 
creative potential in a temporally relaxed situation.
Participant sample: Creativity and image preferences were hypothesized to relate 
to individual attributes that may not be linearly applicable along an entire spectrum of 
creativity. Characteristics that are distinguished among the most creative people may not 
be found in the same relative degrees in less-creative people; image and personality-type 
preferences and levels of skepticism and belief might not increase incrementally with 
increases in creativity. A sample that is either more inclusive of a broader range of 
creativity or comprised predominantly of highly creative people would better-enable 
comparisons along a range of creativity scores or distinctions within a limited, highly 
creative sample of scores. Relationships and interactions among personality type
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preferences and skepticism and belief orientations with regard to image preference and 
degrees of creativity could be clarified.
Measurement and validity concerns: The non-gestalt images, the drawing task, 
and the Art Scale were included with the intention of demonstrating the congruence of 
subjective preferences for visual images and the ability and motivation to create or 
appreciate patterns constructed from common elements that are then altered in form to 
increase novelty and complexity. The non-gestalt images, the drawing task, the Art 
Scale, and the belief orientation are themselves more subjective than the gestalt images, 
the RAT, and the skepticism orientation, and it is possible that the expected responses 
and relationships among them were more nebulous and difficult to satisfactorily measure 
because of their subjectivity. The necessary objectivity of the experimental setting also 
might influence the precision with which subjective preferences can be measured.
A more straightforward explanation of the failure to associate non-gestalt image 
preference with novelty of drawing constructions and complex figure preference is that 
the measures, especially the drawing task and its scoring, did not validly measure the 
desired construct in a way that would be meaningful when assessed with respect to other 
measures.
The drawing task was based on the geometric shapes and letters used by Finke 
and Slayton (1988), and though conceived to approximate the general aims of the original 
study, it nevertheless was altered in execution and overall scoring to accommodate the 
specific design and purpose of this study. Therefore, the reliability and validity of the 
measure are suspect. The task was designed to measure participants' abilities to integrate 
a common group of simple shapes into a new figure that was both recognizable, or
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nameable, and original. The least-frequent responses received the highest scores. The 
small number of patterns constructed therefore may have given these responses undue 
influence on the total score distribution, a problem that would not be found with the 
larger number of pattern constructions (112) in the Finke and Slayton study.
In addition, the drawings produced by participants were rated on their novelty 
without regard to their complexity, a potential confound when comparing the task to 
measures addressing complexity, such as the Art Scale. A similar criticism can be 
brought against the non-gestalt images. Although these images are novel alterations and 
modifications of gestalt forms, their asymmetries do not approximate the complexity of 
the Art Scale pictures.
Despite problems with the subjective components of the proposed model of 
overall creativity, measuring polar constructs such as gestalt and non-gestalt image 
preferences, skepticism and belief, and convergent and novel aspects of creativity 
independently of one another enabled findings of significant interactions between the 
more-objective and the more-subjective components. These results support the idea that 
oppositional preferences, when combined, might be part of a constellation of variables 
that lends itself to high overall creativity.
Implications of results
Studies of creativity are predominantly focused on the creative product, process, 
or person (Mayer, 1999), although emphases also include such factors as the temporal 
and situational context or interacting system in which creativity occurs 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Gardner, 1993; Simonton, 1984). Creative products are 
considered for their novelty and contextual usefulness (Amabile & Tighe, 1993; Feist,
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1993; Gruber & Wallace, 1999; Koestler, 1964) and creative processes for the association 
and integration of elements previously deemed incongruent (Koestler, 1964; Mednick, 
1962). Creative people are assessed on their capacities for reliably making the 
associations necessary for generating novel products from previous knowledge and 
invention (Gardner, 1989; Wertheimer, 1982), as well as for the personality attributes 
frequently found among individuals with these abilities (Eysenck, 1993; Feist, 1993; 
McCrae, 1987). In their affiliation of familiar and original elements and association of 
remote properties, creative products and processes incorporate complimentary opposites. 
The creative individual should also be likely to reflect these emphases on a dialectical 
combination of complimentary elements in his or her preferences and personality to a 
greater degree than a less-creative person.
The form of creative process or behavior in which the person engages and the 
domain in which he or she works impact the expression and development of these 
tendencies, such that different aspects of creativity might be maximally expressed in 
certain areas regardless of the person’s overall creative potential. Personality differences 
between creative scientists and creative artists have been cited (see Feist, 1999 for 
review), including a preference for order (scientists) and higher nonconformity (artists). 
The speculations and findings of this study might reflect similar patterns of influence and 
expression.
Preference for order and congruence among science-minded people, reflected in 
the discovered relationship between gestalt image preference and skepticism, can be 
related to the capacity to associate divergent constructs into the simplest possible 
expression of information. High performance on the RAT demonstrates the ability to
38
converge on a discrete, correct response, thereby conceptually overlapping with the 
skeptical attitude prevalent in scientific domains.
The Art Scale emphasizes complex image representations and uncommon patterns 
requiring increased concentration, and the drawing task was conceived to evaluate unique 
and diverse image combinations, affiliating both measures with the more novel and 
subjective approach to creativity and image preference. Paranormal belief is inherently 
characterized by a penchant for the unusual and unfamiliar, and fits nicely in the realm of 
subjective preferences.
Tendencies toward nonconformity among artistically creative people could 
underlie preferences for subjective modifications of visual expression, reflected in a 
preference for non-gestalt images. Novel recombinations of form might increase the 
complexity with which the image is viewed and the attentional demands placed on the 
viewer. A diversion from congruent form lacks the immediate recognition of simpler, 
less challenging designs. Violations of form qualities therefore conflict with visual 
expectations (Zeki, 1999), resulting in images that sustain visual focus in an effort to 
resolve the conflicted perception (Zeki). Unexpected rearrangements of form may have 
differential appeal to people depending on their immersion in visual imagery and their 
subsequent quest for novelty, and individuals working creatively with images in artistic 
domains may forego orderly pattern arrangement as a means of representing information 
in favor of creating abstractions that are themselves the desired outcome.
To hold appeal as a creative product, however, such “disordered” images must 
appeal to someone other than the creator, and recognition by the field (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1988) indicates commonalities of preference. Eliminating either the most common
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elements or the remnant details to exaggerate the most essential or salient features of an 
image can enhance the image’s appeal by producing a similarly- heightened response 
(Coss 1968; Ramachandran, 1998; Zeki, 1999). The mechanisms by which images are 
perceived as striking or startling are therefore common with those involved in the 
perception of simple, congruent forms, suggesting that the preference for unique or 
complex images might be developed at least in part by domain dependence.
I conceptualized objective and subjective orientations as two types of preference 
and thinking that would best lend themselves to an optimal manifestation of creativity 
when combined. However, a person’s affiliation with a domain might have a greater 
impact on creativity than can be expressed by a simple combination of opposite trends. 
These affiliations, or the individual’s choice of an area of creative pursuit, might 
influence or reflect differential tendencies and preferences best suited to that domain. 
Someone working in the sciences therefore might be maximally creative in his or her 
domain, and may demonstrate some of the same characteristics, abilities, and tendencies 
as someone working creatively in the arts, but would differ in the proportion of each 
developed quality.
Despite domain-necessitated differences, creative people in the arts and sciences 
do share personality qualities, as do the processes by which they work (Feist, 1991), 
making plausible an evaluation of overall creativity combined from aspects associated 
with both domains. Attendant with the evaluation of creativity and the attributes and 
preferences associated with it is the importance of visual imagery in the arts and sciences. 
Although the processes and purposes for transformation and transmission are somewhat
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different between artistic and scientific work, both illustrate aspects of pattern persistence 
and repetition.
Jungian personality type preferences describe processes of information acquisition 
and evaluation that are applicable across domains. The combination of scale preferences 
produces a personality type with dynamics that are not merely the sum of the contributing 
parts. The finding that preferences for introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving are 
related to creativity does not imply that an INFP type is naturally more creative than 
other types. Rather, the contributions made by these individual preferences, reinforced 
through the continued exercise of the preferences, lend themselves to the development of 
creativity, or reflect a personality predisposed to creativity that is expressed within the 
construct of the whole type.
Different type preferences have been associated with different forms of creativity, 
such as the association of intuition and perceiving with an innovating style of creativity 
and sensing and judging with an adapting style of creativity (Gryskiewicz & Tullar,
1995). The domains in which people of a specific type most frequently work would 
probably favor someone with creative abilities highly suited to the nature of the work in 
that domain over someone whose creative capacities are more integrative and global but 
less directly applicable.
Preliminary data suggest that the innovating style of creativity associated with 
intuition is more prevalent in people high in skepticism (Stemme & Feist, 1999). Clark 
(1955) proposed that religious beliefs and attitudes supplied motivation for creativity and 
achievement while skepticism directed attention toward new forms of discovery. His 
findings, however, did not support his contention, possibly because among his sample,
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skepticism and belief were measured as opposites along one dimension. Intellectual 
curiosity, the desire for new experiences, and the desire to gain knowledge and 
understanding were associated with skepticism (Clark, 1955), and these qualities, though 
not directly measured in this study, could be guardedly implicated in relationships among 
skepticism and belief, image preference, and creativity.
Preferences for readily-recognizable and familiar gestalt images and the 
predilection to create and use these images to convey or explain information would 
reflect the desire to gain knowledge and understanding and to convey knowledge in the 
simplest and most congruent representation possible. Finding a significant relationship 
between skepticism and gestalt image preference supports this association. Intellectual 
curiosity and the desire for new experiences might motivate people using visual images 
in their work to modify these images to increase their novelty, complexity, and 
attentional demands. Although no associations were found among belief orientation, 
creativity, and image preference, the combination of skepticism and belief on Art Scale 
scores and total image preferences provides evidence for Clark’s (1955) emphasis on 
complimentary processes in creativity.
The correspondence between the high skepticism/high belief orientation and 
preferences for complex images on the Barron-Welsch Art Scale was expected, but the 
finding that participants low in both skepticism and belief had similarly-high Art Scale 
scores was not anticipated. The lower scores of unipolar “skeptics” and “believers” could 
be attributable to a lack of the balance provided by the opposite orientation, impeding 
complexity with a deficit of either knowledge acquisition capacity and desire or curiosity 
toward and preference for novelty. The relatively dramatic difference in the scores of
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skeptics might reflect a pure preference for order, and for simple and easily evaluated 
images. These findings and conjectures lend credence to the consideration of interactions 
between objective and subjective components in proceeding studies of creativity and 
imagery.
Further Research
Investigation of the effects of subliminal and supraliminal image presentation 
could clarify the influence of presentation rates on subsequent image preferences and 
determine potential differential effects on gestalt and non-gestalt image preferences 
among creative individuals. Creative people are thought to be especially open to 
subjective perceptions and impressions (Martindale, Anderson, Moore, & West, 1996; 
Smith & Van der Meer, 1994), even demonstrating evaluative abilities toward subliminal 
stimuli (Smith & Van der Meer). Tendencies toward generally higher cortical activation 
and arousal during a “resting” phase among creative people (see Martindale, 1990) 
compliment subliminal impression findings. Perception of personally-salient images has 
produced selectively heightened galvanic skin response in people for whom the images 
are of consequence (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998; Ramachandran, Hirstein, Armel, 
Tecoma, & Iragui, 1997), and may relate to image preference in a similar manner. 
Measures of physiological sensitivity in more- and less-creative people to gestalt and 
non-gestalt type images might support the speculation that gestalt images are more 
readily perceived and familiar among creative individuals, and further studies on image 
preference following various durations of image exposures could determine increased 
tolerances and preferences for images based on the number and type of previous 
exposures and the creative abilities of the participants.
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Supporting Jung’s (1971) view on the biological basis of personality and type 
preference, physiological research affiliating introversion with heightened cortical 
arousal (Eysenck, 1990; Wilson & Languis, 1989) provides further validation for the 
development of a physiological and neurological paradigm for image preference, 
creativity, and personality type. The inclusion of skepticism and belief orientations in 
this model is warranted by evidence of differential cortical activation of the right and left 
hemispheres in people engaged in behaviors and experiences related to attitudes of 
skepticism and belief (Jaynes, 1976; Persinger,1993).
Developing a physiological paradigm for the intersection of image preference and 
personality with creativity should by a supplementary effort to illustrate how these 
variables might relate to one another and be expressed in the creative person. 
Determining whether creativity is a whole that emerges from an interaction among 
constellations of involved variables, or a part of what constitutes the associated variables 
could not be reliably achieved.
Causal imprecision does not necessitate that future studies remain descriptive and 
predictive. A detailed study of the effects of image exposure on the actual use of the 
presented images might provide evidence for both the persistence of image preference 
and creative image use, as well as comparison of the ways in which images are produced, 
reproduced, and modified by people differing in personality and knowledge orientation 
and domain affiliation. A more defined investigation would be an appropriate step 
toward illuminating the ways in which each of these variables contributes to the 
continued creative use of visual images. A broader investigation, including a diversified 
sample with a greater range of creativity, a stronger focus on multiple aspects of
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skepticism and belief and personality-type preferences with regard to domain 
involvement, and direct work with a larger number and variety of visual images, might 
demonstrate additional interactions between objective and subjective factors influencing 
and characterizing the role of creativity in the re-creation of visual forms.
Visual image preference might be a singular quality, or it might reflect global 
tendencies in pattern perception and appreciation. Including auditory forms, such as 
language and musical patterns, and conceptual themes in literature and narrative 
description in studies of pattern persistence could make possible comparison of persisting 
forms among different sensory modalities. Individual differences in ability and 
predilection to perceive and use or create visual, auditory, or narrative motifs also could 
be determined.
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Appendix A 
Gestalt and Non-gestalt Images
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Appendix B 
Remote Associates Test
Items Anwers
1. guy owl man wise
2. soul busy guard body
3. mower atomic foreign power
4. widow board cat black
5. arrow laced narrow straight
6. club gown mare night
7. railroad girl class working
8. surprise line birthday party
9. wheel electric high chair
10. out dog cat house
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Appendix C 
Shapes for Drawing Task
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Appendix D 
Barron-Welsch Art Scale
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Appendix E 
Scientific Attitude Inventory II
1. I would enjoy studying science.
2. Anything we need to know can be found out through science.
3. It is useless to listen to a new idea unless everybody agrees with it.
4. Scientists are always interested in better explanations of things.
5. If one scientist says an idea is true, all other scientists will believe it.
6. Only highly trained scientists can understand science.
7. We can always get answers to our questions by asking a scientist.
8. Most people are not able to understand science.
9. Electronics are examples of the really valuable products of science.
10. Scientists cannot always find the answers to their questions.
11. When scientists have a good explanation, they do not try to make it better.
12. Most people can understand science.
13. The search for scientific knowledge would be boring.
14. Scientific work would be too hard for me.
15. Scientists discover laws that tell us exactly what is going on in nature.
16. Scientific ideas can be changed.
17. Scientific questions are answered by observing things.
18. Good scientists are willing to change their ideas.
19. Some questions cannot be answered by science.
20. A scientist must have a good imagination to create new ideas.
21. Ideas are the important result of science.
2 2 .1 do not want to be a scientist.
23. People must understand science because it affects their lives.
24. A major purpose of science is to produce new drugs and save lives.
25. Scientists must report exactly what they observe.
26. If a scientist cannot answer a question, another scientist can.
2 7 .1 would like to work with other scientists to solve scientific problems.
28. Science tries to explain how things happen.
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29. Every citizen should understand science.
3 0 .1 may not make great discoveries, but working in science would be fun.
31. A major purpose of science is to help people live better.
32. Scientists should not criticize each other's work.
33. The senses are one of the most important tools a scientist has.
34. Scientists believe that nothing is known to be true for sure.
35. Scientific laws have proven beyond all reasonable doubt.
3 6 .1 would like to be a scientist.
37. Scientists do not have enough time for their families or for fun.
38. Scientific work is useful only to scientists.
39. Scientists have to study too much.
40. Working in a science laboratory would be fun.
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Appendix F 
Paranormal Belief Scale
1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
3. Black magic really exists.
4. Black cats can bring bad luck.
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
7. Dreams can provide information about the future.
8. There is a devil.
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does occur.
10. Witches do exist.
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck.
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
14. Some people have the ability to predict the future.
15.1 believe in God.
16. A person's thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
17. Voodoo is a real method to use paranormal powers.
18. The number "13" is unlucky.
19. Reincarnation does occur.
20. Big Foot exists.
21. The idea of predicting the future is foolish.
22. There is a heaven and hell.
23. Ktfind reading is not possible.
24. There are actual cases of voodoo death.
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead.
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Appendix G 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
Which answer comes closest to describing how you usually feel or act?
1. When you go somewhere for the day, would you rather
(A) plan what you will do and when, or
(B) just go?
2. If you were a teacher, would you rather teach
(A) fact courses, or
(B) courses involving theory?
3. Are you usually
(A) a "good mixer," or
(B) rather quiet and reserved?
4. Do you prefer to
(A) arrange dates, parties, etc., well in advance, or
(B) be free to do whatever looks like fun when the time comes?
5. Do you usually get along better with
(A) imaginative people, or
(B) realistic people?
6. Do you more often let
(A) your heart rule your head, or
(B) your head rule your heart?
7. When you are with a group of people, would you usually rather
(A) join in the talk of the group, or
(B) talk individually with people you know well?
8. Do you prefer to do many things
(A) on the spur of the moment, or
(B) according to your plans?
9. Would you rather be considered
(A) a practical person, or
(B) an ingenious person?
70
10. In a large group, do you more often
(A) introduce others, or
(B) get introduced?
11. Are you more attracted to
(A) a person with a quick and brilliant mind, or
(B) a practical person with a lot of common sense?
12. Does following a schedule
(A) appeal to you, or
(B) cramp you?
13. Would you say it generally takes others
(A) a lot of time to get to know you, or
(B) a little time to get to know you?
14. Does the idea of making a list of what you should get done over a weekend
(A) appeal to you, or
(B) leave you cold?
15. Is it a higher compliment to be called
(A) a person of real feeling, or
(B) a consistently reasonable person?
16. Do you tend to spend a lot of time
(A) by yourself, or
(B) with others?
17. In your daily work, do you
(A) rather enjoy an emergency that makes you work against time, or
(B) usually plan your work so you won’t need to work under pressure?
18. Would you rather have as a friend someone who
(A) is always coming up with new ideas, or
(B) has both feet on the ground?
19. Can you
(A) talk easily to almost anyone for as long as you have to, or
(B) find a lot to say only to certain people or under certain conditions?
20. When you have a special job to do, do you like to
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(A) organize it carefully before you start, or
(B) find out what is necessary as you go along?
21. Are you inclined to
(A) value sentiment more that logic, or
(B) value logic more than sentiment?
22. In reading for pleasure, do you
(A) enjoy odd or original ways of saying things, or
(B) like writers to say exactly what they mean?
23. Can the new people you meet tell what you are interested in
(A) right away, or
(B) only after they really get to know you?
24. In planning a trip, would you prefer to
(A) most of the time do whatever you feel like that day, or
(B) know ahead of time what you'll be doing most days? .
25. In doing something that many other people do, does it appeal to you more to
(A) do it in the accepted way, or
(B) invent a way of your own?
26. Would most people say that you are
(A) a private person, or
(B) a very open person? *
Which word in each pair appeals to you more? Think about what the words mean, not 
how they look or how they sound.
27. (A) abstract 
(B) solid
28. (A)scheduled 
(B) unplanned
29. (A) gentle 
(B) firm
30. (A) facts 
(B)ideas
31. (A) thinking
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(B) feeling
32. (A) hearty 
(B) quiet
33. (A) convincing 
(B) touching
34. (A) statement 
(B)concept
35. (A) analyze 
(B) sympathize
36. (A) systematic 
(B) spontaneous
37. (A) sensitive 
(B)just
38. (A) reserved 
(B) talkative
39. (A) no-nonsense 
(B) theoretical
40. (A) compassion 
(B) foresight
41. (A) systematic 
(B) casual
42. (A) quiet 
(B) outgoing
43. (A) benefits 
(B) blessings
44. (A) theory 
(B) certainty
45. (A) determined 
(B) devoted
46. (A) idea 
(B) actuality
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47. (A) strong-willed 
(B) tenderhearted
48. (A) imaginative 
(B) matter-of-fact
49. (A) objective 
(B) passionate
50. (A) make 
(B) create
51. (A) warm 
(B) objective
52. (A) sensible 
(B) fascinating
53. (A) compassionate 
(B) logical
54. (A) production 
(B) design
55. (A) impulse 
(B) decision
56. (A) fair-minded 
(B) caring
57. (A) quiet 
(B) gregarious
58. (A) analytical
(B) sentimental
59. (A) unconstrained
(B) scheduled
60. (A) concrete
(B) abstract
61. (A) practical
(B) sentimental
62. (A)open
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(B) private
63. (A) build
(B) invent
64. (A) orderly
(B) easygoing
65. (A) imaginative
(B) realistic
66. (A) competent
(B) kindhearted
67. (A) theory
(B) fact
68. (A) few friends
(B) lots of friends
69. (A) possibilities
(B) certainties
70. (A)bighearted
(B) firm-minded
71. (A) novel
(B) already known
72. (A) tenderness
(B) strength
73. (A) practical
(B) innovative
Which answer comes closest to describing how you usually feel or act?
74. Do you find being around a lot of people
(A) gives you more energy, or
(B) is often "draining"?
75. When making a decision, is it more important to you to
(A) weigh the facts, or
(B) consider people’s feelings and opinions?
76. Do you generally prefer to
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(A) make your social engagements some distance ahead, or
(B) be free to do things on the spur of the moment?
77. At parties, do you
(A) sometimes get bored, or
(B) always have fun?
78. In most instances, to you prefer to
(A) go with the flow, or
(B) follow a schedule?
79. Do you usually
(A) mingle well with others, or
(B) tend to keep more to yourself?
80. Do you prefer to
(A) wait and see what happens and then make plans, or
(B) plan things far in advance?
81. Are you
(A) easy to get to know, or'
(B) hard to get to know?
82. Do you usually prefer courses that teach
(A) concepts and principles, or
(B) facts and figures?
83. At parties do you
(A) do much of the talking, or
(B) let others do most of the talking?
84. Do your consider yourself to be
(A) more of a spontaneous person, or
(B) more of an organized person?
85. Can you keep a conversation going indefinitely
(A) only with a few people who share some interest of yours, or
(B) with almost anyone?
86. When you start a big project that is due in a week, do you
(A) take time to list the separate things to be done and the order of doing them, or
(B) plunge in?
87. Which is a higher compliment, to be called
(A) competent, or
(B) compassionate?
88. Do you find going by a schedule
(A) necessary at times but generally unfavorable, or
(B) helpful and favorable most of the time?
89. Would you rather work under a boss (or teacher) who is
(A) good-natured but often inconsistent, or
(B) sharp-tongued but always logical?
90. Overall, when working on a big assignment, do you tend to
(A) figure out what needs to be done as you go along, or
(B) begin by breaking it down into steps?
91. In social situations, do you usually find it
(A) difficult to start and maintain a conversation with some people
(B) easy to talk to most people for long periods of time?
92. Would you rather
(A) support the established methods of doing good, or
(B) analyze what is still wrong and attack unsolved problems?
93. Would you prefer to do most things according to
(A) however you feel that particular day, or
(B) a set schedule?
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Appendix H 
Instructions for Participants
Hello, and welcome to this study of visual imagery, creativity, and personality 
type. For this research, I am asking you to pay close attention to two series of visual 
images. During the first set of images, you will view them only. During presentation of 
the second set of images, you will be asked to rate each image on your preference for, or 
how much you like, the image. After responding to each image in the second set, I will 
present you with groups of shapes for you to combine into patterns or pictures and 
several lists of words for which you will be asked to supply a fourth, related word. 
Finally, I will give you four questionnaires to complete. Again, these instructions will be 
repeated at the appropriate times during the study, and you may ask any questions that 
you like at any time. Please sign the consent form, and we'll begin.
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Appendix I 
Participant Consent Form
The general nature of this study of visual imagery, creativity, and personality, 
conducted by Marlene Stemme, has been explained to me. I understand that I will be 
asked to view two series of visual images, rate my preference for these images, use 
supplied visual images to construct patterns and pictures, and respond to a series of 
questionnaires.
I further understand that my anonymity will be preserved and that my name will 
not be associated with my responses or with any of the results of this study.
I know that I may refuse to answer any question asked, and that I may discontinue 
participation at any time. I also understand that any grade, payment, or credit for 
participation will not be affected by my responses or by my exercising any of my rights.
I am also aware that I may report dissatisfactions with any aspect of this 
experiment to the Psychology Department Chair. I am aware that I must be at least 18 
years of age to participate. My signature below signifies my voluntary participation in 
this study.
Date Name
Signature
Student ID Number
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Image Ratings by Previous Exposure to Images
Image Type (In Pairs) Mean Std. Deviation
Gestalt subliminal 4.25 1.09
Non-gestalt subliminal 3.09 .89
Gestalt supraliminal 4.17 1.38
Non-gestalt supraliminal 3.72 1.20
Gestalt new 4.29 1.04
Non-gestalt new 3.07 .74
Gestalt subliminal 4.25 1.09
Gestalt supraliminal 4.17 1.38
Gestalt subliminal 4.25 1.09
Gestalt new 4.29 1.04
Non-gestalt subliminal 3.09 .89
Non-gestalt supraliminal 3.72 1.20
Non-gestalt subliminal 3.09 .89
Non-gestalt new 3.07 .74
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Image Preferences Among Skepticism Levels and Belief Levels
Gestalt Non-gestalt
Skepticism
Level Belief Level Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Devia
Low Low 3.59 .27 3.53 .67
High 2.92 2.13
Total 3.37 .43 3.06 .93
High Low 4.41 .68 2.74 .95
High 4.49 .43 3.63 .15
Total 4.46 .46 3.27 .69
Total Low 4.00 .63 3.13 .81
High 4.1 .86 3.25 .76
Total 4.05 .70 3.19 .73
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Total Image Preferences Among Skepticism-Belief Groupings
Skepticism-Belief Group 
Neither
Skeptic
Believer
Both
Total
Total Preference Ratings 
Mean Std. Deviation
5.35
5.78
3.98
6.30
5.65
.61
.20
.50
.86
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Table 4
Correlations Among Art Scale Scores and Personality Type Preferences
Personality Type Preference Art Scale Score 
Correlation Significance (1-tailed)
Extraversion -.36 .007
Introversion .22 .073
Sensing -.41 .002
Intuition .20 .088
Thinking -.49 .000
Feeling .31 .017
Judging -.39 .003
Perceiving .22 .068
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Interaction of skepticism and belief on Art Scale scores.
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VITA
Marlene Harriet Stemme
Marlene Harriet Stemme arrived in her corporeal incarnation on March 1, 1975, 
appearing first in Atlanta, Georgia. Her early academic life in Cobb County’s public 
education system culminated in graduation from Wheeler High School in the spring of 
1993, and was followed by matriculation at Furman University in the fall of that year.
At Furman University, Marlene received B.A. degrees in Religion and in 
Psychology, from whence she proceeded to the Master’s program in psychology at the 
College of William and Mary in the fall of 1998. While at Furman, Marlene developed a 
fervent obsession with The X-Files, an interest that has contributed to many of her 
academic pursuits, including a research project entitled “Skepticism and Extraordinary 
Belief as Factors in Integratively Complex Thinking,” a presentation on “The Impact of 
Sunday Night’s X-Files Experience on the Quality of Life on Monday,” and her Master’s 
thesis: “Personality Qualities Associated with Visual Image Preference and Creativity.”
Marlene will enter the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology doctoral program in 
the Philosophy department at Washington University in August 2000.
